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ABSTRACT 
We report results from experimental markets in  which two du'  '''J',,~,.'' 
water are supplied to two types of consumers: households and farmers. " 
rios studied, we vary strategic complexity (and centralization) by 
of agents  per market. Centralization of information  by  a  mulL'f.TJLvu.u,", 
(scenario 1) improves market perfonnance with respect to a duopoly 
downstream coordinator (scenario 3) succeeds in  mitigating upstream 
In a complex setup like ours, sorne centralization on the supply or the 
may enhance market efficiency. 
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1  .  INTRODUCTlON 
Water is  necessary for multiple purposes ranging [rom íts use  as  a 
gooJ (potable water and  water for  recrcational  activities)  to  water as a 
factor (industrial usage, energy generation, intrinsíc usage to c1ean  up 
Interaction of usage is complex, since used water retums in different 
be subject to irreversibility (let alone the problems accruing due lO water's 
temporal dimensions). 
Since early debates on market regulation, the management of natural 
(among which  water is  usuaUy  mentioncd as  the most necessary for life) , 
considercd a task of major economic, ecological and polítical  importance. 
cases, water management has been undertaken by statc or local authoríties. 
in sorne countries with a strong tradition in decentralizcd market institutions, 
blem of water scarcity has been tackled with decentralized management by 
less coordinated eeonomic agents. A usual critique of such solutions is . 
ract that water is a necessary cornmodity whose accessibility by al! should 
on  market conditions and  the fem that market prices might make water a 
good»  for  low  income citizens. This  fear  is  basicaJly  founded  on  two 
Firsl, utility maximization by decentralized agents muy be incompatible 
maximization of welfare. Second, decentralized agents  may  fai!  to 
with the dynamic aspects of the exploitation of a resource and  its distn Mlxn RE  ANO  I)(STI~IIlL'TIOl\' or DlFFERENT w/\rFR  QUALlTTES: 
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'!lifferent uses, mainly bl:causc they lack informaÜon on the general functioning of rhe 
While Ihe first argument has been extensively studied, controlling for dyna-
inefficiencics and tearnlllg  fai tures  in  comp1ex  markets  has  been a  far  more 
,_j,,,,,,,,,.ng task. 
In his seminal artiele, Gordon (J 954) showed that complete renl dissipation may 
~jenlerge from the exploitation of an open aceess resouree, whereas a single owner of 
resource  would  be  more  efficient  by  internalizing  cxploitation  externalities. 
anel  Lcwis (1984) established the  rdated result of inverse dependence of 
accmal and the lIumber 01' resourec exrractors. Mason and Phillips ( (997) provi-
experimental  e\ idence  01'  this  rclationship for  small  groups  showing that  an 
of the  industry  si/c  may  induce a  smaller standing  stock of a  common 
. In  the contexl oí' groundwater, Bur! (1964) proved analyticalIy rhat a mono-
induces a  more conservativc usage of the resource. while perfeet competition 
d induce depletion 01' thc economic rent. 
Up to now. there has becn limíted experimental research on water resources, but 
few studies undertaken in  (rather simple) eompetitive settings fed the pessimism 
resourees may be inefficiently usedl.ln an cxperiment with a statie setting, Gard-
et al.  (1997)  sh\ ,w  that higher efficiency is  achieved when a  lower number of 
·ytlr~("tn1rc exploit a eornmon resource, although the expeeted non-eooperative equili-
values are not supported hy the results. In  a water pumping game experimenr 
limited entry), Herr el al.  (1997) observed that subjeet~ faeed with an intertem-
problcm acted '~vcn more myopically and [css  ~uceessfully than in a timc-inde-
serting. Their rcsults suggest that the tragedy of rhe eommons arises also in 
world with mínimal  in~titutional constraints 011  behavior, and that myopic behavior 
. a time-dependent ietting exacerbates this problem. 
In alI these papers, dynamic and static (in)c1Ticiencíes relate to horizontal exlcr-
due lO  eomperition in  the cxtraction 01'  a common resource. However, it is 
.,'«'VIItlCJI<- to assume thar cx.lernalities may also arisc due ro downstream eompetition 
the supply or distributi(11) among firrns extraeling fmm indcpendent resourecs2. 
1 In the resource managcrnCtll I'ron!. a number of intcresling issnes are uealt with in  a series ut' 
papcrs on natural f!;¡S  lransportatinn thruugh pipcllllc nctworh by Rasscnti et al. (1988) 
McCabe e[ al.  (1989). 
2  Fur less complex .',elllps. Ihe cxistcnce oí' vertical relatíom. alllong markets has becn studied in 
labnrnLory in  several OCGlsioIl,'.  1  '01' example, Cioodfcllo\'\  and Plott (1990) and Durham (2000) 
the results from a series ,,1' l:xpcrilllen[S OH  a simple  in  lerms of ils  paramctric structure-
with tW(l  vertically rcbtcd In:¡rKl'h (JH  NIKOLAOS GEORGANTZíS,AURORA GARCíA,GALLEGO  ....  , 
E:'>lRIQUF FATÁS-HiBERÍAS. PRAVEEN KUJAL y TIBOR NEUGE¿AU~' 
Our setup rules out competition in  the extraetion of the resource3  . 
considered here, there are two water sources of Jifferent qualitics. 
is  represented  by  two  different  types of consumers:  households 
water supplied to them may be the result of purificatíon, since 
sume water whose quality exceeds a mínimum IeveL The expermllelrrta 
ses on (hree different levels of strategie complexity (and 
characterized by the number of different types of (human) agents 
keL We study water alloeatian in a market where a monopoly 
poly (treatment 2), seU  water of two different qualities lO  the  ~U'.h'UH'~ 
treatment, the duopoly sells to  a  monopsonist (Jownstream coordin 
behalf of both types of eonsumers4 , Given that in  treatments I and 2 
simulated hy the computer, treatment 3 is the only onc in which human 
hoth sidcs oí' the market (supply and demand), A novel feature of our 
that we allow for mixing of Jifferent water qualilies. This acts as a 
dynamic efficiem:y of water tlow administration, on one hand, and 
ning under hcterogeneolls market valuations of two goods sold into a 
on lhe othe!'. Our interest in such a setting relates to sorne market tf>'ltllTP" .... 
been already Jealt with in the literature6 • and sorne of which are rather 
case of water markets7. Among such features, we mention rnarket power; 
aclm in i  stratio n,  decentralization  (vs,  cooperati ve  decisiofl -maki ng 
cfficiency), etc, 
Generally speaking, our assumptions coneerning consumer utility are  .. 
wly similar to  those in  Williams et  al, (1986) on rnultiplc  commodities 
.;  By dcllning property rights ()f a resource or more 10 asole owncr. lNe COI1centrale on 
which  arise frOIll  ¡he vertical markel  ~¡ructures studied and neglel't lhe  'publíc good' 
rc.~~()urcl..' . 
·1  rnspircd un ¡he practice by  many  politicíans and  suggestions hy atlthors like 
Leal  ( 19~9), adopting Ihe formation oC coalitlOns as  an efficienl ITlelhnd  01' water 
j  A s used by Salelh el al.  (194 J ) lo refer lo a market in  whích lhere are rdatively 
(,  Howc c¡ al. (1986), using a much simpler modcl lhan ours, oITcr sorne ju"tification 
úTIlS for él  solution ID a prohlcm of water now managl:ment in the prcsence 01' ljuallty 
m an up,'tream-downstrearn framcwork, 
,  Adrtllnislratioll 01' dYllürníc  now problcms are a famous exarnple 01' such ch;U'aclen 
th,~  inll'rcst  in  human  behavior under a1ternallVC  market structurcs has  been  lhe  most 
re,ourcc ecol1omics, tlespite the argumcnl by WOl1g  alld Eheart (19íD) tha( incfficiency 
fenioll, in  market design and organizatioll can be ohserved even in  the case 01' sirnulated 
fec() hdlavior. MIXTL'RI·. Af\D DlSTRIllUTION  ()~ [)LlI~ER~"NT WATER QUALlT1ES' 
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rde:pend.en:  in  c()n~llmption. Two further features which are rather specific to the 
of water are addcd to the structun: described so far:  First, buyers are res-
to buy up to a certain amount of each typc of water, given that their purchases 
period  are  Llscd  to  serve  their  current  needs.  Second, a  constant  inflow 
comes ro  illcrl:é\sc  in  each perind the stoek of water in  the basins of eaeh 
In fte!, foHowing a standard fonnulation oY similar grollndwater extraction 
, a  Ill\'v'l:r  stock implil:s a  highcr l:xtraetioll  cost. giving rise to a positive 
belwcen each period's marginal eosh and pasl levels nf extraction. 
find that com]lL'tition on lhe supply sitie (lrcatmcnt 2) reslllts in  lower social 
as cornpareu I(] a rnollopoly (IrcaLment  1). J  ntrodul:ing uownstream eoordi-
(treatmcnL  :))  in  Ihe  duopol istie  markd  increases  market  cornpctitioll. The 
'V~I"U"H"" i, llnabk to cxercisc its market power and the deadweight loss dccrea-
o¡,~'~'FA"", some n:nlralization (upstrcam nr downstream) is  social1y  desirable 
remairlÍng part of lhe paper is organizcd in tbe following way: section 2 pro-
some di:jcussíon 01 the thcorl:tical framcwork in  wbich we derive lhe social1y 
solution. Section 3 describes lhe experimental design.ln section 4 we discuss 
ohtüncd and, in  section 5, we conduue. 
~:.  T¡¡u)[{l'rrCAL FRAMT,:wcmK AND SOClAL OPTl'vlUM 
to the  ohvioll~ diffículties associatcd with lhe multiple interactions among 
socio-e~onol1lil: ami  cnvironmental a~pects oC water managernent, theoretical 
ie modcb foclIs only 011  spccific qllestions. TbllS, most of the lilcratll-
based on partíal cquilibrillm analysís. 
See, for c),ample, (¡",er and S(rnchel (1984) .ond  Rllbio al1d  Casino (1999). 
'Which are  suh-o[llilnal L'u11lpareu  tn ,inlUlaled .ogents in trealmcnts  I and  :>  who. by designo 
.im individl ally oplimal way. In fael, a vaSl  litcralure is dedicatcd lo variOllS factors which may 
fOf observcrl shnrlconlÍngs or 11lll1l<ln  bdlavior in eOIuplex environrnents, like misper-
offeedback (paich ami  S\erman, 199:1,  and Slcrman,l9(4), limitations in  subjeets' leaming 
tu stratcgic cnrnplcxity  (RIChards  anrl  Hays,  1498), or multi-task decision  making. 
wi:h asytnllll'lries (García-Gallego and Ckorgantzís, 200 1,  ami García-Gallego el al.. 
numbcr of Jaclol", lllal r¡¡VOUr subjects' illlpro\'cmcnt al' performance havc. a!so, bccn íden-
eJi.amrle. trial-and-crror algorithms llave heell ,,!lown lo racilitale COlJvcrgcnce ()f the stra-
by UllIllfOl!lll'" ,uhjects towarJs syllltllclric. lülJ-informalion cquilibrillln prcdictions, 
in Gard¡¡·( ;,II1v,', ". \  q')X) ror ¡he case "r a I'ricc-.sctting oligojJoly. ¡(JO  NIKOLAOS (;I'OI{GA:'>iTZís. AI:ROHA GAHCÍA.(;ALLEGO. 
ENRIQUE  FATÁS-JUH~RÍAS,  PRAVEEK  KUJAI. y TIBOR NEl:GEflAUER 
Al[uifers should be considercd as  different both from renewable and 
wable resources. because the recharge does no! imply an intrinsíc growth 
cxisting  stock  bUI  is, generally speaking. exogenously generated. 
cxtractioll rate exceeds the reehargc rate, the stock will be exhausted, 
exlractioll  whieh equals the  reeharge, a hydro-eeonomic equilibrium 
bling  an  infinite cxploitation. Costs of cxtractioll, whieh  arise 
illversely rclatcd to the aquifer's water table. 
Ln  our model  there are two  rencwable stocks (aquifers) SI{  and  SI. 
water may be extraeted. For the  sake oY  ~implieity, assume that the  rp{·tl"  ......  , 
respective basin is deterministíc and constant. The inflow to the respective. 
assumed to ecase whcn the storage capacíry ofthe aquifer is reached. The 
of eOllsumed water is  assumed to  be ncgligible. Thus, ehanges in the stoeks 
10 extraction and recharge only. Extraetion costs are supposed (o  be  twice 
tiahle functions of quantity and stock  ~ize. First derivatives are assumed to 
rectively, positive and negative, whcreas second derivatives are positive. 
We eonsider the possibility that the water resourccs differ in their rp."·T",."ti·",;i· 
lities. Quality of water in an aquifer may he lower duc to marine inlrusion or 
infiltration of fertilizcr fmm agriculture. Let Ihe qualities be dcnotcd rp"npC't;,,,,.l, 
QII  and  Q¡,  wherc QH > Q¡ >0. The qualities are  assumed to  be constant over 
However, lhere exists the possibility of providing any intermediate quality by 
water of the  Iwo sources. Mixing quantities K,{ and K,  of the two qualities 
water wllOse l[uulity is given hy: 
K',ºII + K,.Q, 
Qc, (KII•  K¡.  Q/I'  QJ = ------
Quality of potable water should weakly exceed thc constant minimum 
standard  Q",,",  where Q/f >  Q",m  > Q/,.  Mixed  water of quality  Q>I  may or may 
'iatisl'y the minimum quality standard. depending on the qLwnlities  and the 
whieh  are mixed. In  any case, any  quality may  be  improved at  a eost, which is 
inercasing function of the differcncc betwcen the  l[uality  hefore ane!  after 
tioll.  Moreover, a givcn improvement DQ of a lowcr quality is  Jess costly tban 
s:tllle  improvelllellt performcd on a higher quality. Let (he  initial quality subject 
purification he  QI/'  The purification (osL denoted  by  C\J  K,  DQ.  Qu)'  for a 
water qtlantily K=KH+K/,  ' is assumed to satisfy the following eonditions: MIXTI :RF '\[\,lJ 1  liS mllll'T10!\ OF D11+I,R"N'1  \\ATER QUAl.ITIES' 
.. LV I,X "/:I\/M/:,\"  IJV IFRTlCAL ,ITRIH'lI'/IJ., h  ,\ ('(!Ml'l.I,X !vl,\I<I\FI' 
ac,o  ¡¡2e\" 
-~._-'~> _  ..  ---.:...> 
¡¡( -I(J  (j2C,[)  ac  Ir! 
.--> --"~>  _. 






>0  (2) 
A centralízeu krot nwy eXIst  which  co-ordinat.:~ the resource tlow betwcen the 
anu the consume)'s. 'l'he principal objective 01' the distribution knot is the een-
of (he uecisions abuur quantity anu quality sLLpply  and the distribution ro 
respective consumers. Figures 1 ami '2  sho\\' lhe distriblltion scheme that opera-
in eaeh seenario. 
Suppose there are rnan}' l"()J1surncrs in the economy whose behavior can be aggre-
under one 01'  l\vo tYIW'i;  i)  the  h()llSehold~ (/1)  and ii)  the farmers (F). Consu-
uiffer in their respective prcfcrenccs regarding the quaJity of water. Both typcs 
a higher quality of the resource to a lower onG.  Farmers prefer more quantity 
each  product  to  less.  HoweveL households  will  eonsurne  water whosc quality 
excceds a minimuHl ,tanuard. 11' mixed ljuality does not satisfy this condition 
will be subject to purifieauon. The purification proeedure is assumed to be costly 
that it is not Jrofitablc to improve quality abovc the minimum standard. Hen-
, the quality consumed by households will be the maxirnum between the minimum 
ity and the mixed qualily. Thus. Qo = 0.\1 and 
Let the hOllscholds take lhc purificarion cos( inlo account in their utilíty function 
assume  the  uUity  fUllctions  Uh=U¡,  (K,.Q",)  anu  UJ,=U,  (KJ,QMI)  (whcre 
+K/.h'  and K¡,=K/JJ+Ku)  nI'  the  respective eonsLll11er-types  to be twiee diffe-
with respect lo qUClnlÍty  and mixed quality. Farlllers' utility is increasing in 
arguments. while clepending on the purificat!on cmt funetion. rhe utilíty func-
of hOllseholds lllight be i ncreasing in the quantity of low qua  lit  y only up to ti cer-
limil. In facr. it  will be Inereasing if míxcd L[uality weakly exceeds the mínimum 
standard. Frnm lhe <!:;:;umptio!1  of t\vice dillcrcntiability of the utility  func-
it follows that the sum uf IhG  functiomi is  lwiee differentiable. too. The indirect 
wclfare  funct Ion  V( K'I' KJ)  which  maxirni,.,cs  consumer surplus  for  a  gi ven 
of water can be de'icribed as follows: IIP  NIKOI  /\()~ (iEORU,\.vrzís. Al !fU JRA (¡;\RCL\-GAU.EGO. 
J::-IRI(ll11: r·!\TAs-JlJllERIAS. I'IV\VEE'\ KUJAL y TIBOR .'\ElIGEBACER 
V (KI/' K,) =  IIWX  Uh (K"", Kw Q,\/I,;  K". KI)  + UF (K"I'"  KI.I' QWF;  K  , 
Kw,/,·  K¡  .  ./¡i, 
s.l. 
(i)  KI!  '" K"i, + Kili 
(ii)  K, =  K'i' + KI.I 
0 11  Kili!  + QI K,,, 
KilI> + Ku! 
( i l'!  QIII 
QII Kili  + QI Ku 
KIli' + KII 
f\S a  benchmark ror  ou1'  experimental results, we are  interesled in 
oprimal  ~()ltlti()n  (Jf  water supply. Givcn the assumprions above, we 
propam lhar  maximízcs social  welfare1o .  Without  loss  01'  generality, 
initiaHy  rhe  resource stocks are  in  the natural  hydrological equilibrium, 
llppet bOllnu  01' the storage eapacity. Let. uenotc, respectívdy, recharges of 
lit)' water, anu 11)  lhe starting time of extraetioI1. Assume lhe social rate of 








dSI!;  {-K"I + IIIi' it  Sil < S/I'II'" 
-d-;-"'O  S/I""",  ()thenl'isc 
liS,!  { -Ku + ([l.' (f\ < S/,"" 
~!f- '=  S/",/1, ofhcrwisc 
s  =  S  111,[\ 
1I"i"  ¡/ 
,)', 'q  .:-:::  5', m!U 
,,'  I¡¡<leed.  j¡ i.' a prohkm wh¡ch is ,olvahle hy mean., of optimall"OlllroJ theory, wherc the 
dre  IIIL'  ,I;¡le, ,uld ,Ile  l.luantilic, lhe control \-ari,lrJ!c" 
--------------------------------------------------- - --~,IIXT\ :RI', :\'.1) ])1\ mIBI  :'110'< OF IlIl'\:I:]':I:,1' W.\TI:J{ (jl  ':\l.ITIES 
,'L'\  /:,il'UII.\!i  \'1" 11:\' VUU/CM, SI/U (,JI 'IU: /N .\  ('I!.\[{'IFY MAHK1:T 
JIU 
By rneans of the rl'sulting current value Hal1liltnnian ami Pontryagin's maxirnurtl 
principie  (assum lIlg  <In  í Iltenor solution)  rhe  t \\'0  follow  ing  cane!itions  have to  be 
satisfice! in the h:/{Jro-ecollolllic cquilibrium: 
av  I 
JK~" 
ae" ((1 i!' S¡) 
(¡Sil 
(Jet- (al, ' .'l¡) 
aSl 
(5) 
These  condilions  in  L'í)  ,illlllltaneously  rktennine  the  steady-stale  standing-
stocks of Sil and '~I' Thl'Y ha..,ically stale tha!, in  the long-run, the marginal social uti-
lit  y  , which embojie.., tfll'  rl~~IX'ctive reSOl!rce  pricc in  the ecollomy. should equal lhe 
social casts of exLractiol1 reprcsenLcd on the righL  hand side
11
• 
3. EXPERIMENTAL PARAMETERS Al\D MARKET DESIGN 
The cxpcrimenls wt:rc conducted at the  Luhowlorio de investigación Ión  l,:cono-
mía Experir.!cnral (UN/:/'.X), at the University of Valencia (Spain). Three treatments 
with  14 indepenc:cnt marKt:ts (per trt:aLITIt:nt)  \Vele  ~tl1dit:d in  which a tota1 of X4 sub-
jects participated. Thc::i  \\'t:rc  recruitcd among 1I1ldngraduute swdcnts ()f Ecollomics 
,at the University ot' Vakncia. Urs hschbachcr\ ,nflwarc  ::~rree 2011  was lIsed for 
the programing uf Ihe designo An experimental scssioll too k between two and two and 
a half hours. Subjecls t:<lrncd  an averagt: of 3.'i()()  ptas ('i>20). 
We use the 11Iodel  de,cribed above with Lhe  following values for ¡he parameters: 
(i)  Recharg:.::  (111/'  11,) =  Ll,  3) 
(i  i)  In ¡tial amI  ma)( i  111 \1111  stot: k si zes  L\II'  Si) =  (20.  20) 
(iiiJ  Water qlJaJitic,: ((JI!'  (J¡l = (5,  1) 
(iv)  Minilllu n  qua1il\' standard demanded bv  ¡he household: Q""" = 3 
11  In cach condltioll, lhe' lir'll\\'o lerms, !Jolh I'0sili\'(', rcprcscnt lhe margmal (os!s whieh rc\ult 
extraeling: a q\ amily  I<:!,  (I\"pcctively K, I (mll1 lhe W:ltcr ,tock Sil (S, J.  The lhird tcrm rcflects 
shauow pricc 01' Ihe re'Olllú'. thalls, lile IInplit~d l'n,[, induced hy  a low0!' wMe!' tJhlc. which ¡¡re 
on all  fllturl~ L::\.lr:ICII(111 lOe)  r-.;(KOLAO~ (;HlRGANT/'.íS,,\URORA (,ARCÍA-GA1LEGO, 
FNR1QUE FArAs-JIIflERíAS, PR¡\VEEN KUJAL y  TIBOR ~ELJGEBAUER 
Thc utility anel eosl functions used are provided in the appendix. Applying 
eljuatiol1s, in  the steady state 01' the social optimum a stock size of (Sir SJ =  ( 
is obtainal associatcd with the príees (P,P P,) = (102, 86), The quantities (Km'  Ku.) 
ami (Kili' K".) = (0.45, 3) are assigncd, respeetively, lo household (h) and 
mI  (r) eonsumptiom, Suhjects were told that sessions would last 45  uenlllC1~'" 
3.1.  Experimental design 
The experiment adopted a  di serete time framework. No explieit  r",l-AT'.>~,.. 
made to water in  rhe instructions aiming at a no-Iahel experiment. 
knew thcir product dype», in the sense thal they wcrc conscious ahout a 
láetlce by  cotlsumers for one good (high  quality)  over the other, 
lncw that the]r produets were demand substitutes (though not perfeetly) and 
prodLlCtion  cosl strueturcs were identical. Subjects receivcd atable with 
cnsb depending on the stock size (sce the instructions in the appendix). 
Consumers reccived specific information about the increases in their ' 
In'el' from each additional unir  bought. Experimental subjects (consumers 
duccrs) werc introduced separate1y to their tasks and did not know any details 
the rcstrietions on  the other side of the market (the information was provided 
tel) at any instance on their computer screcns). A history window would 
pasl outcomes regarding own decisions, quantities, payoffs and market prices. 
uucers and COllSUJIlers  were asked to decide about thcir respective rcservation 
fm cach unit of proclucl within Ihe rangc 1 to 5 (the maximum quantity each 
lhell1 could U'aue  in each period)iJ, Procluecrs had lo post, simultaneouslY,five 
offcrs which should equal the minimum price at which they were wi1líng to seU 
rcspecti \'e unir l4, The offers had lO cxceecl weakly the cost (JI' the corresponding 
amloffcrs of subsequent units wou1d have lo be non-deereasing. On the demand 
slIbjects would have to submit five sealed bids for each product which had to be 
(monotonically) increasing for subsequent units and, al most as high as the rent 
would arise from one extra unit. The bids should refleet the maximum priee at 
1,'  HowcVér. in onJer to avoid end-game bchavior, we 5loppcd se.'siono alter periad 35, 
l' Tbc ljuantity  limitatian  wa;, designed to account  for thc  lime  rcótrictions  af exr1enlffif:fl1 
c,'\f'os¡tion, 
l' Prod\lcer, in lrcalmen! 1 hao lO  posl flVC  scalcu offers for caeh producL \11\TI :In \NIJ D1STHIHUTION 01  LlII+LRlMI WATEH QUALlTIES: 
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consumcrs wcr~ wilhJlg 10 purchase an addítional unit. Subjects knew that. after bids 
were announced, al!  unilS ot' Ihe same prmlllct in  a pcriod would be sold at the same 
market price (see instructions). 
3.2.  Market i/lstitutions 
We  aim at comparing lhree diffcrent market structurcs. Our basic market (treat~ 
ment 2)  is dcsis l1l:d Lo  be a fully decentralized structure in which resources are inde-
pendently own~d and  run  amI  consumers act in  an individually optimal (simulated) 
way. Two alternative structures are designed in  which either upstream (treatment 1) 
or downstream  (trcalml'nl  :'))  action  is  coordinated and, in  both cases, coordinating 
agents are human subjcct,. The non coordinatcd par! of lhe market (suppliers) in tre-
atment  3  is  also  run  hy  human  subjects,  Therefore. together  with  upstream  and 
downstream centralization. other shortcomlllgs of human  behavior in  dynamically 
, and strategical y complex environments can be anaJysed. 
Trcatment  I invoJv¡;s  a monopoly (j(lint owncrship of both sources) in  the ups-
tream market, ami  oplimal (simulatcd) coordinatiol1 of dowl1strcam behavioL One 
subject is posting price ol'fers for both water qualities, Given these offers. the maxi-
mal consumer rent  is  determíned in  lhe simulated centralized dowl1stream  market: 
V( KH'K¡)  -- 11"  k.  whCI'L~ IV  denotes the vector uf sealed offers ami k denotes lhe vec-
tor 01' quantitü: s. Thu\. the bundle of high quality and low quality water which pro-
duces the high  ~st con,umer rent is  allocatee! in lhe economy, and the corresponding 
offers of the sL.bject  stabJ ish lhe clearing prices, 
Treatment 2 is Ol!r "hasic» and lL:asL ccntralized one with which the other two tre-
atments  could be  dírectly  compared. In  this  ll'catment,  we assume  uneoordinated 
aetion on both sides 01' ¡he market with a duopoly (clecentralized oWl1l:rship ofrcsour-
ces)  selling to t\\lO  silllllJated (decentralizcd) lltility-maxímizing eonsumers. Given 
the multiplicít:/ 01'  índepcndent agents. further problems in markct clesign had to be 
so] ved , Thc prl Jducer-subjec(~ did not recei ve  information about how markcts would 
cIear and, therdore, ¡hey clicl  not know what intluence the decisions of the competi-
tor would havE  on the own demando AltllllUgh subjccts posted their offers simultane-
ously, markets clcan:d iu  a ranc!olll order determincd by lhe computerl'. This mecha-
15  We  uscd  ItIIS lllcciJ"1l1,1l\ hecause we wcrc  IlO!  intcrestcd in  a  system¡¡tic Stackclberg markct 
~tructure, fav()rin~ I1IK 11:  11,,"'  ! \\ 11  markcts ilJl(1  the c:mrcspondingly consumer type. 1[11,  :-.JIKOl.AOS Gl'O]{(;A:-.IT7.ÍS, AUWRA GARCíA-(¡AI.LE(;O, 
I·.'\RI()I  ~r: Fi\Ti\S-JlIBEldl\s. PRAVI'E!\' KUi\L y  TIBOR l\EIIGEIlAlJER 
ni,m was intToduced aiming at avoiding rolally incfficienl outeomcs in 
Illcrs buy too ll1uch of lhc produet which leasl hts lhcir spccific needs. Thus 
wcrc gi ven preference in the low quality markel and households were pn~ferré 
hi~h quality markct. Thereforc. a consumer was allowed lO  buy in the 'other 
llnly  ii the 'own' Illarket was the first  lo clear and thc consumer had been 
,OI1lC excc,s denl<lnd. 
111  treatl1lcnt  .3.  three  slIbjccts  participated  in  each  session. 
IIwncrs of the sources, aeted on Ihe (deccntralized) supply side of the 
third  ()ne.  a rcprcsentative eonsumer, would be on the  (eentralized) 
aeting as a lllonopsonisl and reprcscnting both consumer lypesl6_ Like in 
a rnarkd day eomprises a sequencc of two, in  which the subject who acted as 
.,umer reprcse"ntatÍvc buys slIbsequently in both markets whieh opened in a 
orcler.  In  (he sceond market, lhe number of units purchased in the first 
takcl1  inlO  aceount
l7
• The markct-clearing is  cletennined  by  means of 
across unjt offcrs and unit bids. In  particular, the markct-c1earing price is 
min (""ilhin the producer's priee offers) excceded by the maximum price 
e:OIlSLllllcr's  hids), for the sarne unit, which lhe consumer weTe  willing to payo 
(he quantity would be determined too. 
4.  RESUITS AI\I) DISCUSSION 
This section is organized in  three subscetions. The first one is  dedicated 
ohscr\'atíons coneerning stock sizes.ln the seeond subsection, market prices 
bid-and-ofrcr results are presentcd and cliscusscd. Finally, in  the third subsection, . 
undertakc lhe comparison oí" the lhree treatments in terms 01' welfare and eflficierlc 
"lIlee' ¡'is/her carnings werc propDrlional  (j()';¡.,¡ ID  lité  c()n~lIll1crs' ren!. 
I  Sllbí~ct~' ~LTCellS wOlllJ  display lhe maximal sarisfaction Ievel associateJ with ¡he 
ri(l¡¡ ni' all addlliunal unil. ii i  ~ ;. 
vl!XTU<I'  .\'illll\~TRIIlLT!O"i Ol'IJlI'I-ERU\TWAI1J{ Ql:.\I.IL'I"S: 
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¡:i¡ •.  In figure 3, (he (cull1lllulativc) distrihutioTIs 01' cnd-period stock sizes are presen-
~;~d. Stock siLes be10w lhe socially optimal hydrological steauy state stock ~ize of (SI!' 
¡.~) =  (4.84, 5.(1) werc hanlly obscrved in  treaLtlH.:nt  1, whereas, in  treatmenls 2 anu 
l's a few times a high qllaliLy stock sil.e ()f 3 unils was rcached - which stcmmcd from 
~,~ne subject's ~'rategic" in  cach trcatment. Conslderíng the distrihulÍons, we see that 
il¡~ach one of the scenari()s resulted in  a dlfláenl resource-managcment. It can be seen 
~<, 
mfrom  figure  3  thal  tre<l!ment  1 did  not produce any  perceivable  stock d¡fferences 
l,across water qualitics, ()n the other hanu, in trcatmcnt 2, the low quality stock domi-
bí.ates the high '.juality one, while in  treatment " almost the oppositc prevails, 
;"  Table  1 eo1tains d,¡ta  01\ the stock si7es in  (he  14  markets aher 35 experimental 
'¡periods. A Mam-Whitney (est does nol reject lhe hypotheses of stochaslÍc equiva-
¡l·Ienee of last  p(~riod stock sizes across trcatments  rOl'  low (respectively, high) quali-
[itiesI8. Acomm:lll fcalUre can he seen in figure c,L in which we observe a c1eclining ten-
mdency  in (average)  ~t(ll'ks duríng the course of the sessions. However. this trend  is 
¡'!llueh weaker in  treatmen!  I  (only  significan(  during  lhe  rirst  five  periods). This 
jobservation is. genera!!y  ~peaking, an indieator 01' the [aet tha! subjects, in treatmen! 
il:t, have givenJfiority  Lo  the goal of maintaining the hydrologieal equilibrium of lhe 
~.system, wherel'i competing produccrs, in  the olher two treaLments, have been trying 
~,:to seU as  man~' units <1\  possiblc, In fact. in  (rcatmen! 3, the decreasíng rate at whieh 
Il'this trend is pnduced indicates that prodllcers ha  ve also tried to avoid selli~1g beyond 
1" flcertain point leadin~ lo slocks which fall  too lo\\' (so that extraclion costs woule! not 
••..  Crease to  level~ irnplying a serious cOIllpetitive disauvantage to them). 
In any case, the relatively high cxlractiol1 eosts associated wüh low slock sizes 
:}(:d  subjects  i 1  all  rcgimes  -on average- lo  more  eonservative extraetion than 
'1>\Iould  eorres¡:ond lo  the socially optimal slcady S(ate  solution, In other words, we 
tain the opposite  ur  lhe  eOIl1mon  resouree  overexploitation  result  attributed  to 
" mpetition in  the extraction stage, That is.  the setup studiecl  here results in somc 
'Ud of horiz¡:·ntal  externality leading lO  unc!cr-cxploitation of the resourec by firms 
ho are comreti!or" in  the downstrcam market. 
18  ThrOllgh'l(lt lh" 1'''1'<'1'.  \\'e'  use' a a=,05 Inel ,,1' ,i!cUliricilncc, We  use standard tests fmll1 Sic-
1  and C<I,tclla'l  ¡ 1  '1;-:;-, NIKOL\()S ('FORG  .. \:\TZÍS.AUIWRA (,ARCÍA-('ALLEGO. 
E'RIQI.:E [',\T/iS-JCBERíA5, I'I~AVEEN KUJAL y  TlHOR NFUGEBAUER 
4.2.  Posted ofters, bids and market prices 
h,llo\ving the  theorerical  framework, the hypothesis has to be  \/",'e;f;i"A 
ces, postcu hius and offers shoulu eorreetly reneet the diffcrenee in 
is, high quality water is expcctcd to yield highcr priees. offers and bids 
quality one. However, in a setting Iike ours, in whieh human subjects 
in an environmcnt whose market cquilihrium is far [rom obvious, the 
should not expeeL Lhis to be a trivial or even a usual result. In fact, the 
hlem implics a fUIther issue to be taken into account by subjeets who should 
care ahout what they seU  and eam in caeh period but, also, what this implies 
prodllct's stock and, consequently. eaeh producer's unit costs in future 
Thc most important descriptor oí" the supply side of OUT experimental 
ami aho an  indicator for the cognitive processes of subjccts with rcspect 
anu learning, is given through the posted offers (since they are the control 
oC prodlleer-subjects). Figure 5 plOlS the average of the posted offers and bids 
first unít of each water ljuality over the 35 periods of the expcriment. Table 2 
1'or eaeh trcatment, the posted offers (for the first unit of eaeh ljuality water) 
ved  in  períods  I and 35. 
In  the first  periodo lhe monopolist in treatment 1 posted, in all  markets, a 
orrcr 1m the first  unit of high ljua]ity water than for the low quality one. In the 
periocl, lhe rest oí" the units were also offered al priees which correelly reflect 
ditfercnec~. In  this treatment, the same applies for period 35  and, for the rest 
pcriods. only three times (out 01' sevenly possibilities) an inverse order was 
Along the  35  periods, and eonsidering all  trearrnents,  155  times (out of 2450) 
qualitl' water \vas offered al a higher price than high ljuality one. Given that the 
wal' for prodllcers 01' controllíng their levc1 of sales was through (very high) 
we  observe excessively high offers for the las! units (mainly, lhe 4'h  and yll). In 
tieuJar. the freljueney 01'  Lhe  event of a higher offer for the low quality is highest 
rhe fifth  1I11it2U  In  sorne cases, subjects were ablc to increase their sales ofhigh 
lit y water (selling less low quality's) by  raising offers for the water 01' low quality. " 
,.)  This fimling s!Jould  no! be eonfused with a sim¡]ar argument by Sal iba el  al. (1987) concer-
ni,,!!  1m ces which do !lot reflee! waler values, where valuc differencc, are due lo water scarcity, etc. 
,'1'  In facl. in  most or lhe oceasioll!. in which selIers posted a higher pricc rol' low quality water 
lhall 1m high LlU<llily one, lhe eorrcsponding unit of low quality was not sold, ,\lIXTllkl·. ¡\:\D lJ1STRIBIJT10l\ 1)1' ml'l'I:Rf'NT WATER QUAl.TT1ES:  109 
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Unlike the monopo!  i~t in trearment ! . ~cllcrs of low qua! ity waler in treatmenls 2 
::and 3 lack an) inCt.:nti\C' 10 post higher olTers as a means 01' promoting the sale of high 
'.  quality water. This ohservation follows  text-hook theory on monopoly vs. duopoly 
prieing in stalic ditlerentiateJ product markets. according to which monopolist pri-
cing leads to lowcr prlce differences rhan duopoly pricing L1oes. Focusing on the first 
period of eadl treatmenl. stochastic equivalcnce of posteJ üffers for any unit oí' high 
".  quality and low quality water cannol he rejeclt:d by a (pair-wise) U-test in any of tre-
"atments 2 and 3. In treatment 2. the low quality produeer posted a higher offer for the 
1'1 (2nd ,  3rd • 41h • 5'h)  unil of his/her product i  11  :-s  (:-S.  7. 7. 6) out of the  14  markets. In 
this trealment. offcrs hy  the seller of low qualily water were, on average, higher than 
those posted 'Jy  the  ~cllcr of high qua! ity  \  .... aLer.  In  treatment 3. the same is  tme on 
average but, lor the  1,1  (2I\(j, 3rd , 4'h. 5'h)  uni!. we find only 4 (5. 5.4.4) observations 
in whieh the nffer postcd hy  lhe seller of lo\\' qua! ity  was higher than the correspon-
ding offer po~;ted by  lhe seller of high qual it; (see t¡¡ble 3). 
More spe:ifically. in  pefiod 35, the  1  ,\  (respectivcly, 2"(1, .... 5Th )  offer posted by 
the low quali:y seller exceeded 6 (respectivl'ly, 7,8,9, 10)  times the ccln"esponding 
....  offers posted by the  ~dlers of high quality water in  treatment 3 and  I (respectively, 
1, O, 0, O)  time in  treaLmenL  2. During the experiment. lhe number of times that the 
low quality produeer posted higher offers (ror any  uniL  of his/her product) 1han lhe 
high quality produeer \ignifieantly deereased over time in treatment 2 and increased 
in trealment :). A tw(Hai!ed Spearman rank correlation test of the null hypothesis oí' 
..  no eorrelatioll of time amI lhe number of observations in  which the low quality offer 
exceeds the high one is rejeeted (favoring a positive trend). 
In few w1)rds, treatments 1 and 2 have ren(;eted better the quality differences on 
.'  .•  priee offers  liS  compared lO trealment 3, in  whieh we observe a tendency towards 
equalization ,)f the ollers across products. Therefore. subjects who acted as  monop-
sonistie distribution knots. have influenced the market outcome in  a sense that tends 
to distort the expecled differenee in priees as a result of the difference in qualities. 
In trealm:nts 2 ami 3, the average ofters v,Jere !ower in lhe 3yh pefiod than in the 
first one and low quality produeers posted. on average, lower offers than high quality 
producers did. In  trcatment  l. th(;  offers  Cm  botb proc1ucts  were higher in period 35 
lhan in the first one. !n all  markets anc1  in all treatments, it is  observed that subjects 
who submitte d in period 1 otlers below 100 posted higher offers in the 3yh period, and 
those who pcsted otTers above lOO  posted 100.ver offers in  period 35. Look at table 4. 
The eom Jarisol) 01' postec1 offcrs acm~~ treatmcnts yields that, in the first period, 
monopo!.sb (trealment  1)  postcd lowcr oller~ than duopolists (treatments 2 amI 
3). The Manll-\\¡hit Il,'\ [··test rejects the null hypothesis oC equal posted offcrs in  tre-110  NIKOI.AOS GEORC/\NTZis. AURORA GARCiA-GAILH;O. 
ENRI(.)UE FATAS-JlIHFRíAS,I'Ri\VEEN KUJAL YTIilOR NELJGEBAlJER 
atl11enl~  l  and 2 in most occasions, with  lower offers in  trealment l. A 
n:sult is obtaincd between lrcatrnents 1 and 3 for somc unils (espeeially for 
(lf high quality water). Contrary to what static theory would predict, it is 
thal. in  the duopoly (treatment 2) offers are highcr than in the monopoly 
ConsiJering rhe  dynamic nature of the experiment, an  intcrpretation for 
rently  odd behavioral pattem is  that subjects signal cooperation in the 
l:nvironment at the beginning 01' a session, hoping to achieve the collusive. 
in  í"uturc periods. In lhe case of monopoly, subjects approach equilibrium 
bclow  as  has  heen already  pointed out  in  other experimental  studies21 . 
SCCtllS lhat high first-perioJ offers are rather specifie to oligopolists' 
al establishing lhe collusivc outcorne. On the eontrary, low offcrs in the 
seem  rather specifie  lo  monopolists' strategics aiming at reaching from 
initially  unknown optimal  strategy. A further factor which  could favor this¡ 
behavior obscrved  in  treatmenr  [  may be found  in  the priors  oí"  our 
may, initially, apply theories based on  real  world  situations in  every new 
rhey face. In this sense, promotion oí" ncw products with low prices may be a 
although it scems less reasonable in  our eontext. Moreover, period I's posted· 
in treatments 2 and 3 are not stochaslically different from each other. 
in perind 3S  (lreatment 3) are lower than in the other treatments. especially 
ted by high quality sellers. The rnonopsonistie subjeels have used their 
and pushed down the offers posted by sellcrs of high quality water. 
The resulting market-priees fenecr what has been stated aboye: in period 1, 
senls a ehart of the average priees in the experiment. In  lreatment 1, the "",p.,.", ...... 
ces inerease signifieantly over time (showcd by  a Speannan rank correlation 
lrcatment 2, the high quality price increascs and the low quality price decreases, 
le  in  treatment 3 rhe contrary happens. However, these observations are not 
cally signifieant. Priees in trcatment 3 are lower than priees in treatments 1 and 2. 
cifically, priccs of high quality water in  treatment 3 are stochastically dominaté!: 
those ol' treatment 2 in 2S  periods, with increasing importance along the expelr1ll:W: 
On the demand side of the markct, in trearment 3, monopsonistie subjects 
b](.!s  fOl"  high quality and low quality units (average hids for the first unir are 
in  figure  S).  As  would  have  bccn  expectcd,  subjccts  use  thcir  market 
'1  Seco cspccíally. García-Gallcgn and (Jeorgantzís (2001). M](TURI: A:'-,i) I.lISTRIHUTION 01' DIITJ:RI''1 [W  .. \TI'.R Qt.:AIITII'.S: 
,j,V D,)'f'R{,\U··VF O,V VI.RTlCM. S'IR/jej'{/Ia. Ie\'  .. \ CO,llI'IFX MARKI:,,! 
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markcl  )["icl:;; thmugh thl:ir hids. As can bl: ClJIljl:CIUrccl fmm lhe chart, ave-
bids present .\ llon-inlTl:<lsing trend. Moreovcc bascd Oll individual data, we find 
only in fournarkets 17, tl. 9,11) a (significant) de crease ofthe bid  s (table 5) is 
, while,  111  markél 9, this dccreasc is only observed for the first  unit. In  the 
three cases :7, í-L  11). market power has been exerciscd by downstream subjects 
posted very  ,imilar bids (negaüvely correlatcd with time) for the units along the 
Let us look a: lablc ú. Excepl from the three markds (7, 8. 11)  ll1entioned above, 
. correlation b( twel:Il the sati"faction leve! for onc extra unit and thc bids is usual1y 
ve and, spe~ially in  markets 1,2, 10 Y 14. this relation is significant. 
In trcalment 3. ~Otl1C c;ubjects (at least 3 Ollt uf 14:  in  markets 2.10,14) nearly 
"'I'''''''''C~U the satisfaetio]\ levels for one extra unit from their screcns, thus, hehaving 
in perlect eompetitioll. Therefore, lhe random  shocks resulting  from  scquential 
were not smoothencd by  dowllstream behavim amI  were transmittcd to  upstrc-
markets. As a conscqucncc, Lhe  lcvels 01'  s.\tisfaclion 01'  lhe  monopsollistie suh-
in treatment 3 decrcasc over time. Yet. in lllarkets 7, tl, and lO in which subjeets 
.........  ri,"",; their monop,onistic market power, consumer surplus  increased, Figure 7 
the  averag.~ payotls oí" experimental subjects ror each treatmcnt over the hori-
of the expenment. Observe that. in Lrealment  l. monopolish' average profits pre-
a (significant) increasing trend. Tab1e 7  includes data on (average) earnings for 
type of fin) (per ¡rcaLmenl) and levels of satisfaetíon of monopsonists, Observe 
the decreas ng trend of satisfaction lcvels for consumers in treatment 3 is signi-
(r,=.-O.3t:  1_2.Y)I)~c. 
As far as the quanTiLy of water (of each quality) allocatcd in eaeh treatment, look 
figure 8. Conparing graphs in this figure. we find  that trcatment 1 exhibits most 
extraction  ~Iath whlch  wc would assume  in  lhe  optimal solution,  i  .e.,  maximal 
at tlie  beginll Ing. and stahilizing  aL  the hydrological equilihrium (where 
"",\·,.""t""  ..  equals rcch"r¡.:e).  Over the 35  pcriods, an  average quantity  wa, supplied 
respectively, (K¡,K
iI
)  oc  (2./:\ (lA); 2.X (! .2})  1ll treatment 1, (2.5 (1.3): 2,1; (1.2» in 
"''''''TTIpn'  2, and (2.R  (! .6): 3 (1.3)) in treatmen!  :~. Tahlc R reports the average quan-
allocated in  the thrcl: markets. No significant lrcnd is  fnund. 
21  Small  nlll'lhn..; illcll,  ;lIc' 'lanoard devJalion. 112  N1KOLAOS GEORGANTZÍS, AURORA GARCÍA·GALLEGO, 
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4.3.  Market Peiformance 
Lc!  liS compare thc three treatments in  terrns of market efficiency. 
weJfare averages (aggregated utility minus production costs) are reported 
At  an  aggregate leve], no significant trend is  observed. However. all 
present markets in  which the level of social welfare (on average)  u'.  ,~",""'"'''' 
cantly) over time (markets 1,2 in treatment 1;  markets 5, 14 in trealment 2 
in  trcalmen! 3), as  well  as  markets in  whieh this trend is  (significantly) 
(rnarkcts 4, 6, 11,  12.  13  in trealment  1;  markets 9, 12  in  treatment 2; 
10  in  trealment 3). As far  as  treatment 3  is  eoneemed, observe that 
and  10, even in the presence of monopsonistic power, present levels of 
beJow the average social welfare (on aggregate) and, in the case of market 
catee!  by the Spearman correlation coefficient, average social welfare . 
time «r,= 0.4: (2.51))). 
Figure 9 shows average social welfare along !he 35  periods. Notice 
less volatility in the trajeclory of [he averages in treatment I than in the ather . 
alments. With respect to treatment 3, since monopsonistic subjects, J',v,,,.., .......  ·, 
king. failcJ to dictate the market, thc introduction of an additional subject 
bccn responsiblc Cm more noise. 
An  indicator for inefficiency in  our hydrological moJel is  the quantity of 
los!  because the stock is  al  its  uppcr limito  incfficiency arises since  rp<',,,,,,,,,<,~¡, 
tllJW  into  the  economy  are  forcgone.  From  table  !O,  we  perccive  that the 
'saving' usagc, in terms o[ water management, prevailedunder the conditions 
atment 3 and specially fOl' the high quality water (Ioss equal to  119) . 
Moreover, in trearmenl 3, the recharge rate was more frequently exceeded 
productioJl than in  the other treatments (Jess number of obscrvations which felt 
of lhe constant periodical recharge). 
5.  FINAL REMARKS. POUCY IMPUCATlONS 
In  a series 01' experimental markets we have lested the performance of three 
native ways oí" administrating the flow  and the markel Cor two different water 
rícs. Some of the resu[ts rcportcd above ha  ve straightfOl'ware! implications fOf 
mil' policy in  the presence of dynamic ane! strategic complexity. 
hrst, centralization  uf  agent  decisions  on  the  supply  or the  demand  side :"'lIXTlIRI ..  \ND DlSTRlHlJTIO~ OF DIFH,REl\T WAn.R QuALlTIl.S 
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desirablc. Spccifically, centrali7.atíon of consumer actions mitígates upSlre-
power amI  helps internalize lhe horinmtal externalily among consumers 
consumer  lypes.  In  faCI,  even  a  market  with  ideally  behaving  decentralized 
was shown to  he dominated in  terms of social efficicncy by  a  market with 
(thus, ímperfcCI) agents aCling as downstream coordinators. Furthermore, the 
of a monopsony tends to equaliLe prices across product qualíties, which 
Second. contrary 10 standard wisdom concerning market power in simpler setups, 
<4"'0,",""'"  01'  decisions by  an  upstream monopoly also leads to higher levels of 
wel1'are ami a more ef1'icient water management. That is, givcn that the dyna-
aspects 01' water rcsource management are important, upstream centralization is 
desirable bccallse it  is  more likely to guarantee an  efficicnt exploitation of lhe 
, and avoíd rnarket (price, quantity, profit) volatility  . 
.In fact, our results indicate that volatility in al!  magnitudes has been higher in the 
of a larger Ilumber of human agellts in  the market. which seems to SUpp0l1 
view !hat learning ltl enbanced in lhe prcscnce oi' a more reliable feedback which 
likely to be  rcccíved when subjcets <tcl  in a more stable environment23 . Fur-
, the ,hock inlroduced by lhe market clearing mechanísm in treatment 2 does 
seem to have becll a serio  LIS  obstacle fm learning, given that price offers posted 
subjects te:1d  to stabilize over time. despitc lhe volatility in the quantitíes sold and 
earned. Togelher  with  the  remark  on  the  reliahility  of the  feedback,  this 
lcuds us lo Ihe eonclusion Iha! strategie comp1cxily is a more serious pro-
for human  s learning  in  unknown envimt1ments  than are  moderate stochastic 
. A funher remark supporting this ellnclusiot1 is that buyer subjects' strategies 
the highest \olatilíty among all  dala obtained. To  the a1'orementioned short-
in our subjcets' learning, we have to add lhe faet that subjects of this type 
«unique» in eaeh  ~cssion ami any imitation of ~uccessful subjeets of the same or 
types is  impossiblc24 . 
23  A fealur: whíeh Wl>uld givc ,ame hUI  nol !ull ,upporl to lhe very pessimislíc vicw of psycho-
like Brehmer (19NO)  who claimed  that  Iearning  í.,  difficult when  nol  imposslhlc  unlcss suh-
are exposed lO  (ve!'v simple) linear anu  llctcrlllillisllC cnvirontncnts. 
24  As sugg~sled,  atll()tl~ olher authors, hy O!Tcnnan ami Sonncmans (1998) and Dllffy ¡lDd  Fel-
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Compari~on uf water flow  management across treatments, indicates that 
mer coordination has led to a lower waste of the resouree than any orher of 
kct structures studied, although a eonstantly declining trend of the stocks 
that in a longer expcriment this seenario is the most likely to cause a problem 
lage. rn faet. this can also be concluded from the faet that, in this treatment, 
ve the recharge rate wcre observed more often than in any other treatment. 
in  all  treatments,  average  productions  huve  been  almost  as  much 
slightly lower 10 equal) as natural inflow, which suggcsts that the majority of 
jccts  have  managed  to  keep  the  system  close  to  its  hydrological 
(inflow=sales), This al so  indicates that the dynamic factor has  played an 
role in subjects' actions, The consumption of high quality water exceeded on 
gc the consumption 01' low quality water in alI treatment;;, 
Regarding  thc  usual  problems  in  resource extraction games, depletion 
resource doe5 not appear to be an important issue, because the cost structure 
ted subjccts from sailing too much in each period, However, we founJ that, 
a dcterministic environment in which one agent managed two resource stocks 
optimal demand conditions, a non-trivial allocation problem arises, since the 
polistic subjects needed to improve (along time) their performance, The 
we  draw from our experiment is  that an  appropriate definition of property 
lllay be not enough [or an efficient management of rcsource markets, 
6,  ApPENDIX 
6.1,  Utility and costfunctions used in the experiment 
The houschold's utility is  given hy the following function: 
whcrc the last teml in brackets denotes the purification costs: 
"  Orlen mentinned as a solution to a huge varicty of resource-relatcd problems like, for 
pk, in Colhy el al. (1')9":\), li~;i 
: 
l; 
M¡XC ¡ (JIU  ,.\:"n DlSTtlIBUT¡ON OF LlllTER!'NT \V,'\TER QUALlT1ES:  11 
¡c  AN I,.XE'!.IUkllc'N
C
/  UN \IFRTICAL S1RUCnilll: EN ,\ COMI'U,X MARKf'T 
••  ¡:C, 
, e  (K  K  Q  I ~  ¡~,,' (Q"i + (Km  '  K,y), ir Q.,,, > QM. 
¡¡  UJh  Hi1~  JII'  \-li..  ' 
,;>  O.  othenvise 
The farmc"'s utilitv  i  ~  function is as follows: 
> 
UF (KHi., KfI' Q'Ii) = 1,7' Inll + 0.5 . (Q\II + :1  ' (Ku + Km)) . (Ku + KiIi.)1 








j  Thus, the following  utils  (unit  utilities) for  high quality  and  low quality  we  re 
to th,~ houschold (h) and the farrner (F): 
c,' 
.c_ 
h,  household  Low  ()  1  2  3  4  5  ._. __  .. 
""c  High  ()  ()  174  301  356  378  378 
i,  1  399  492  579  637  679  711 
,¡c  2  c. 
555 
_c  •••  624  690  753  797  832 
;  3 
. 
660  717  771  822  869  906 
c;  4  740  7R9  !l36  !l80  920  959 
5  806  ::;49  R90  929  965  999 
j>  -"'-
---- .... __ .- .e. 
l!] 
.Farmer  Low  ()  1  2  3  4  S 




1  274  391  491  572  639  696 
%';  2 
.  __ . 
422  509  SK4  647  702  749 
3  525 
-- Sll4  655  707  7.')3  794  .. 
~;~. 4  604  662  712  757  798  834 
;;,.' 
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6.2.  Instructions26 
6.2.].  Producers 
The goal of Ihis cxperiment is the study of decision-making in eXpel1.ITlen.tal 
kets. The decisions you'll makc are directly related to your monetary reward. 
cnd of the session, you will be paid privately in  cash. You can make any 
rcgareling these instructions by raising your hand. Any communication is 
biddcn anel  ir  will be penalized with the immediate cxclusion of the 
Tlle Experiment 
Por 45 rounds. you are going to participate in a Market Expcriment with the 
wing characteristics: 
l. You take part on a market in which there are two consumers (r~nn~si',"I]1'J1 
nne single agent in treatment 2) and two producers. Producers compete to seU 
production and you are one of them. 
2. Two commodities (good  1 and good 2) which are demand substitutes 
not identical), are supplied in  the markct (each one supplied by  one producer). 
producers have similar costs s!ruclures. The computer will tell  you which of the 
producers you are. 
3. Although consumers have difIeren! tastes, they both prefer good 2 lo good 
You  have to decide about the minimum sellinx price for each unít of your 
dllCt. To do that, you may use the following information: 
1. The tablc hellow shows lhe production cosls per unil of your product 
ECUs as our Experimental Cllrrency Unit). 
2.  Using the informalion included in  the table, yOl!  havc lo announcefive 
l11um)  prices al which you  are willing lO  seU  your units (afterwards, you will seU 
maxímum oí' S units). 
2',  In  bold, we add sorne details (hat might help the readcr lo understilIld the ex.perimental sessiQOS;:;¡~ MIX II.RI: ,\ND DlSTRlHlJ nOi'< 01' I )II:¡;¡;RI;.,\T WATER QU¡\UTIES· 
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Pricing schemes  rOl'  the 5ht unit bundle cannot be decreasing monotonically: 
for the fir--t  unil mus! no! be  highcr than the price for Lhe  second unit:  the 
unit price musl not be higher than the third unit pricc, and so on. 
unit co,t dccreases with Lhe stock size. Your initial stock size is 20 units and 
gel, ever)' round, three more units. Your ,tock can never exceed 20 units and, 
, a:ly additional (over 20) units you may receive are immcdiately vanishcd. 
tt  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20 
--------~----~----~---_r----~--_+----_r  .. 
4  2  2  (]  1)  o  (]  o 
exwr¡ple: Jmagine you are at the bcginning of a round with a stock of lO  units of 
and you gel your additional 3 units  (ClS  you will at the beginning of each round), 
stock now  is  13 units. Your unit costs for the units you produce are the lollowing: 
co:;t oí' the first unit produeed is  2 ECUs, 
eost of the second unit produecd is  2 ECUs. 
the eost oí' the third unit produced is  4 ECU  s. 
eosl 01' the  fout1h unit you produced is  7 ECUs. 
and, finally, (he cosí of the fifth unit produccd is  11  ECUs 
order lo eam mnI1cy, your pricing schedules must be such that each unit's pri-
the cOl'rcsponding cost. Following the examplc, the lowest profitable price 
first unir shoulcl not lie below 2 ECUs (Íls uni! eost), etc., nor should it exce-
price you fix  fOl"  the second unit. Thcse rules also apply lar the rest of the units . 
•.  you sell 5 unils, yom stock size. in lhe following mund, would be  11  units (8 
kept plus  3  you  get in  the  new  roulld).  If you don't sen  any  unit after your 
price schcme, yom stock would be  16 units (13 you hacl plus 3 you get). 
mukin~ and eamings 
. You  have  lO  fill  in  the  boxes that  appcar at  your computer sereen with  the 
prices al  which you are willing to sell your units, In each box. you will also 
atilln ah"ut each unit cost. IIK  NIKOI.AOS (a,OR(,ANTzts, AURORA G,\RctA-GALLFGO, 
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2. 80th producers decide on prices simultaneously and, as a ~V'U"",,,,U.ql1 
matioll about the other produccr's decisions will be available only after 
ovcr. 
3, Although you have to propose fíve different minimum prices, a11 
solcl al the same price: the highest unit price proposed (by a producer) . 
edecl by the correspondent bid proposed by the buyer (which reflects his 
to pay). In this way, it is al so possible to know the llumber of units sold (al! 
a pricc offer higher than the proposed consumer bid). 
4. The money you will earn at the end of the experiment will be the 
carnings yOll  get in each round. The exchange rate is  10 ECU = 3 ptas. 
6.2.2. Representative Consumer (only treatment 3) 
Thc goal of this experiment is the stucly of decision-making in 
end of the session, you will  be  paid privately in cash. You  can make any 
rcgarding these instlUctions by raising your hand. Any communication is 
bidden and it  will be penalizcd with the immediate exclusion of the  p.Yln  .....  TT1''''nt'' 
T/¡(' Erperillu:'llt 
For 45  rounds, you  are  going to  participate  1I1  a  Market  Experiment with 
following characteristics: 
I . In the market, there are one consumer representative and lwo producers. 
prodllccrs compete to sell their production and you are the consumer relJre,\'eIUUlIVt 
2. Two commadities (good  I and good 2)  which are demand substitutes (but 
Ilot identical), are supplied in the market (each one supplied by ane producer). 
producers huve similar costs structures. 
3. Your are the representative of all  potential consumers in the market. AH 
know about consumers prcferences is that they prefer good  I to good 2.  : 
4. Thc table bellow includes levels of satisfaction (mcasured in ECUs, an Expe~: 
rimental ClIrrcncy Unit) for any combination ol' commoclities you can buyo Your earw1 
nings, at the end of each round, will be exactly the difference between your satisfacd 
tion levcl and your expenditure. MIXTI 'fU' ,\:-.Ill 1J1STRlIll'TIOt\ (lb' DIFIT,RI':NT \VAn::K QlJMJTltS 
,IN hX/'UilAII:,\'o/ UN V/:RIIC\L STRl'!'n'Ii/: r\ .. \ ("()MI'/,I:X AIAIiKET 
GOOdI/GOCd2  __  j- I~,~  .2  3  4 
O  ()  187  l61  'i2X  655  , 
1  199  586  7'iJ  X70  lJ63 
---
2  h7.'  7lJO  909  11l2t'i  1115 
3  S2tj  946  1046  11.\1  1220 
4  '/77  1064  1151  1232  1300 









You  have to decide Oll  your reservation pricl: (i,c, the highest amount of money 
are willing to pay rOl eaeh unit of produet) 1'or/l\,(, units of each producto To do 
, you may liS,: thc following facts: 
a) The reservatíon pnce schedule you wblllit in  each round should be not mono-
increasing, Tha(  i~. (he highest price you are willing to pay for the second 
of any good mus! no! hc higher than lhe highest pricc you are willing to pay for 
first unit of the samc produet, and so on  amI so [orlh. 
b) Each round, your real consumptiol1 \'Vill be restrieted to a maximum of 5 unÍts 
each product. 
, ion making (//1(ll:'iln¡il1gs 
l. Introduce (in  the computer) your decisions  about rcservalÍon priees  and be 
to use thc appropriate boxes. In a round. all unit" of the same produet are sold 
the same priee: the nunimin (the highcst 01' the mínimum priccs which results from 
producer's  wiJlingnc,~ lo aeecpl) whieh lies  below  ~ome (highest) price which 
from y{lur willingncss to payo This way. the numbcr of units that are sold in 
, market is dir<:etly  dctcrmincel, 
2. Every timo: you choosc the highest price you are willing to pay for eaeh unit of 
you will gd spccific information abou( thc incremental value on the utilíty 
by the  eonsumer~ you represent. 
3. In each rcund. although you have to propose fjve different reservation príecs, 
units of the same product are sold at the samc Illarkct price: the highest price offer 
is exceeded by your corrcsponding biel,  Since this unil is the last one the pro-
is willing lo  sel1  (amI you to buy). this unit  is  the last unit sold in the market. 
4. Your earnmgs will  he ¡he elifferenee belw:een lhe value got from the eonsump-
(the valué rdlectcd  111  tile table) ancl  thc cxpenditure in purchasing the units. 120  NIKOLAOS GEORGANTZÍS, i\LRORA UAR(:ÍA-GALLEGO, 
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AII eXmn¡J/e: Look al lhe table above.IL in the previous fOund, you 
of good 2, your potential earnings, as a function of the units of good 1 
the correspondent eolumn), are: 
Ir you huy no units of good 1 eonsumers get a utility value of 361 
ir you huy  1 unit of good 1, consumers get a utility value 01' 753 ECUs, 
if you huy 2 unils of good 1, consumers get a utility value of 909 
ir you buy 3 units of good 1, consumers get a utility value of 1046 
ir you buy 4 unÍts of gooa 1, eonsumers get a utilíty value oí' 1151 
ancl, finally. if you buy 5 units of  good 2: consumers gel a utility value of 1 
5. In  rhe  interface of your computer. you will find boxes in  which you 
wrilc your bids for eaeh unit of produet. You also find  rhe utility value got 
purehase. For example, if you prefer to buy one unit of product 1 rather 
Ihe  increase in the utility value you got is 392 ECUs (the difference between 
361 ). 
Your nel  payment will  be  half of consumer earnings. The exchange rate 
EC U  so::3  ptas. 
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8.  FIGURES 
Figure l.  Water üístribulion structure in treatments 1 and 'l 
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Figure 3.  Enu-period stock; cummulative distribution for the three treatments. 
percentage of the total stock; horizontal axis: interval of stocks 
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hgurc .'i.  End-period stock: cummulative distribution for the three treatments. 
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1  (,  11  21  26  31 l\llX·IITRI\~1) DISTRIBUTION OF ()jf'f'LIU':-'¡·1  WATER QLJALlTIES:  1:11 
A V I:X!'I·RI·\IFXr ()N VFRtICAI. 'Ii«iCTl.'llh IN ,\ COMI'U:X MARKET 
9.  T¡\RLES 
Tablc  l.  Slock '1/.l'S ILow/High 4ualí1yl 1Il1realmcnt, 1-3 after 35  pcríods 
SLI  SIII  SU  SIl2  SU  SIl3 
1  ~  lú  17  (,  9  11 
IX  14  11  5  9  13 
l)  13  17  -l  15  14 
')  11  ()  10  ')  16 
I~  16  11  13  20  15 
1')  ILJ  1  S  15  6  12 
5  X  17  7  7  10 
:-1  ')  14  15  10  .'i 
1I  ')  !  .5  4  8 
I~  7  11  17  4  5 
h  4  ,  11  11  13  [3 
11  ti 
4  20  15 
IX  17  1)  12  20  13 
lO  9  J7  K  17  4  ---_._  ... 
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Table 2.  First unit posted offers (w) in periods 1  and 35 (treatments 1-3). \.-UllSLUU< 
bids eb) (treatment 3). 
35 MIXTlII{I·. AND DISTRmUTION Oc DIFFERENT WATER QUALlTlES:  133 
AN f;XNIiIMENT (IN VFRTlCAI. YIR[H '{URE IN A COMI'LEX MARKET 
SpCllman rallk correlation cDcfficien( (rs) and t-test o[ time dependence oI 'disc-
quilihrium' offen, (i.e., wL>wH) 
* -7.7*  -'S.7" -5.2"'-5.9*  4.3*  3.1*  3.[*  4.7*  5.3* 
of HO at a= .O'S-leve! of slgni ficance (Itl> 2.(4) 
U statistics of pairwise comparison bctwccn posted offers (treatments[ -3) 
wS  53*  61 
Note: Tht! expectcd value of the U-statü,¡ic is 9R. 
~UlV~llel1t distributiolls of offers aeross t['calmen!s. 
46*  58.5  [ 6.5** 
Rejection oi' H"  in  favour of the a[lernalive of highcr offcr~ in ¡he [alter' (former**) treat-
(u::>.OS;  U<55) 1"1 
Tahlc 5_ 
2  r 
I 
3  r 
I 
4  r 
r. 
I 
6  rr 
t 
7  r 
1 
X  r, 
9  r 
lO  r 
11  I 
I 
12  r 
13  r 
14  r 
Agrc- r 
gilt~ 
NIKOLAOS GEORGANTZÍS, AURORA GARCíA-GALLEGO 
ENRIQUE FATÁS-JUBERfAS, PRAVEEN KUJAL y TIBOR NEUGE~AUER 
Spcarman rank (r, ) correlation coefficient and Hest of posted 
(treatment 3) 
5J9* 
OA7  0.44  0.32  0.36  0.24  0.26 
3.02*  2.81 *  1.91  2.23*  1.45  1.54 
016  0.15  0.17  0.14  0.10  0.31  -0.03  -0.06 
0.95  0.84  l.02  0.80  0.60  1.86  -0.19  -0.32 
0.27  OJO  rU5  OA2  0.51  0.05  0.11  0.41 
1.61  1.80  2.18*  2.69'  3.39'  0.31  0.61  2.56* 
0.45  OA9  0.35  0.23  0.15  0.49  0.24  0.16 
2.93*  3.20*  2.12*  1.35*  0.89  3.21 *  1.44  0.90 
OAO  OA5  0.51  0.65  0.68  -O.2l  0.11  0.12 
2.53'  2.87'  3.44'  4.98*  5.38*  -1.26  0_61  0.70 
-0.21  -0.20  -0.10  -O.O~  OA6  -0.44 
-1.25  -l.l7  -0.59  -OA6  -2.99"  -2.82* 
-OAO  -0.35 
-2.47*  -2 .. 16* 
0.38  0.37 
2.36'  2.28* 
0.63  0.57 
4,66*  4.00' 
-0.77  -0.78  -0.74  -0.57  -024  -0,85  -0.88  -0.89 
-6.97*  -7.05'  -6.32*  -4.00'  -1.39  -9.33*  -10.82"  -11.38* 
-(U 4  -0,16  0.06  0.22  0.09  0.12  0.27  0.18 
-0.81  -0.93  -0.37  1.33  0.52  0.68  1.60  1.05 
-OJ4  -0.16  -0_06  0.22  0.09  0.12  0.27  0.18 
O.SI  -0.93  -0.37  1.33  0.52  0.68  1.60  1.0S 
O.lJ  0,14  0.19  0.19  0.19  0.26  0.33  OA6 
0.74  0.81  1.12  1.14  1.10  1.55  2.03*  3.01' 
o.m  0.089  0.071  0.076  O.l41  -0.41  -0.34  -0.46 
0.174  0.514  0.41  0.439  0.818  -2.6*  -2.07*  -2.94* 
,vote  ..  11,,:  r,lt,b(.ll=Ü 
'¡,.  n:jcction of HO  al a"'.05 level of significance (ltl>2.o4) 
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AlI /:'XPERlMf,N/'ON VU(I'lCAL S'IRUCTUIN.-IN ¡t COMi'LEX MARKET 
6.  Spearman rank (r  ) correlalion coefficient and Hest 01' postcd bids (b) with consu-
unit satlsfadion lev,'1  (fOl' one extra unit) which was displaycd on lhe subject's screen 
(trealment ]), 
1.24  3JI" 
r,  0.1"  0,83  0,47  051  0,45  0,90  OM  0,69  0.76 
[  7JJ3*  KA6 i ,  J.ü7*  3,40*  293*  11.76*  15,64*  5.44*  6,69* 
r,  0.3<~  0,17  (L08  om  -()20  -0.05  OJ5  0,16  0.22  -0,05 
t  2,05'  097  OA7  OAO  -l.I7  -0.31  2.16'  0%  ]JI  -031 
" 
-0,02  006  0.D2  O.ü9  ()O')  -()14  0.33  OA3  023  0,37 
I  -0,11  0.1'  (LlO  052  050  -078  2.02*  2,n'  lJS  228* 
r,  0,61  OJ'i  0,19  -0,17  -0,20  0,15  0,88  024  0,00  -0.06 
[  4,6:*  2,]3'  1.14  -0.96  -LIS  0,84  lOA1'"  lJ9  -0.01  -033 
r,  0,1 t  (),2fJ  0.21  0.31  0,75  ·OJ7  0.44  0,44  032  OJO 
t  O,X]  1.53  1.26  1.87  6,56'  -2.27 *  2,85'  2,78'  1.92  1.83 
-0,1 K  -0..11  OAl  -033  -0,25  -026  -0.36  -O,IR  -O.Jl  -0.25 
-2.56  -255'  -2.02*  ·IA8  -1.54  -2D*  -LOS  -0.61  -1,48 
-OAI  ·11.44 
-2.61'  -2,83' 
OIO  0,18 
1.17  1.06 
0.27  OS5  0.47  ()62  -0,0]  0,02  ·0,04  0,23  OAl 
1.61  3.74*  3,05*  4j()*  ·()Ü4  0.11  -025  iJ7  259* 
-----
r,  -OJ4  -(J.67  -0,66  -0,66  -0,38  -OJi8  0,63  ·056  -0.55  -OJ6 
t  ·6.~4'  -5,lú i  -5,08*  -5,10"  -234'  -533*  -4,61*  -3.91*  -3.79*  -224* 
" 
-O: )1  lUJO  0.26  OJ2  UA4  0,12  0.2l)  OJO  0.57  0,18 
r  -OJ7  11.111  L55  5,88'  2.85*  (J,71  1.77  L78  4,01*  1,06 
" 
0,:!6  010  0,08  025  0,00  0,07  0,13  -(),O6  OJ2  OÜ4 
r  1,:í2  1I,:i7  0.46  IA6  lUlO  IL41  0.75  ·0,34  1.94  0.21 
" 
O.lí4  0.7:;  0,82  0,68  lUS  0,91  0,64  ll,96  OJO  0.44 
t  4,19"  6AV  8.31'  539*  7,12*  12.53'  4,84*  1939*  5.57'  2,85* 
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Tahle 7.  Average profits for each type of nnn and each water quality (treatments 
!evels of satisfaction (on average) for the monopsonist (C3) in  treatment 3. ,).p~:arrnanr"Í1 
correlation coefficient and t-test of time dependence for subjects' payoffs 
/' 
Av. P (L1)  196  222  188  210  209  113  188  185  188  168  109 
012  0.85  0.01  0.37  0.28  O  -0.30  033  0.60  0.40  0.73 
069  9.31*  0.08  2.3'  1.68  -0.20  -1.50  2.03  4.35* 2.52* 6.07* 
'\\'. P(HI  316  288  275  293  148  288  220  234  240  89.9 
r  0.28  0.08  OJ2  0.16  0.24  0.27  0.47  0.70  0.48  0.76 
I  1.65  0.45  1.92  0.93  1.45  1.58  3.05'  5.57* 3.18* 6.76' 
TI' 2  Al'. P  316  [70  184  208  [60  [66  261  206  271  2][ 
r.~  0.29  0.19  0.[2  0.16  0.14  0.29  0.07  -0.4  0.61  0.13 
1.74  1.12  0.72  0.95  0.83  1.73  0.40  -2.5* 4.42*  0.74 
Av.P  [70  347  355  325  380  315  347  195  298  282 
r,  O  -0.40  -0.20  0.19  0.34  0,07  0.56  -0.20  0.61  0.65 
I  -0.20  -2.2*  -1.30  1.08  2.08'  0.40  3.83*  -1.10 4.39* 4.92* 
TI'.  ~  142  202  134  199  [83  21[  [48  [42  154  79.5 
0.20  0.21  0.27  0.19  0.24  0.10  0.43  -0.10  O  0.02 
!.l8  1.22  1.59  1.13  1.4  0.57  2.77'  -050020 0.10 
Av. P  288  237  232  249  222  204  174  329  207  [66  286 
0.28  0.02  0.53  0.25  0.47  -0.10  -0.40  -0.30 -0.40  -0.70  0.57 
1.70  0.12  3.57'  ISO  l05*  -0.60  -2.4*  -170 -2.7*  -5.4*  4.02* 
Av.P  631  660  656  581  717  579  731  628  608  517  558  587 
r  -0.29  0.02  -0.71  -0.28  -0.57  0.25  0.56  -0.45  -0.14  0.25  ~0.36  0.20 
-1.77  0.13  -5.8'  -1.65  -3.95*  1.51  3.92*  -2.89*-0.83  1.46  -2.22*  1.19 
lVo/e:  The null  hypothesís is H,,:  r-lt, 1'I,(t)]0{). The asterisk (*) represents a rejection of H" at 
level ol' slgnificance (ltI>2.o4). The sign (-) indicates negative correlation n.· 
lv1IXTUKl-. AND DISTRIBlTION 01' nlFFFRFNT WArER QlIALlTIES 
;"v rXeHIIMr:NT (iN \fF.RTlCAI. STRL'rTf!li}: IN A COMPLEX MARKET 
Table 8.  Average allocated quantity of each waler qualíly (treatments 1-31 
-
Markel  KLI  KHI  KL2  KH2  KL3  Km 
1  2.23  2.26  1.71  3.17  3.23  3.17 
2  I.4Y  1.09  2.ü9  3.34  3.23  3.14 
3  2.77  2.91  l.EI)  3.29  2.91  3.03 
4  3.23  3.17  2.89  3.03  1  3.23  2.83 
5  ,  2.60  2.S0  2.69  2.KO  1.94  3 
6  1.46  1.40  1.77  2.91  3.29  3.09 
7  ~.14  1Jl6  1.74  1.29  2.S6  2.94 
8  3.26  3.23  2.94  ]JI  2.57  3.11 
9  3.20  .1.23  3.26  334  1.37  3.26 
10  2.80  3.29  3.14  0.86  3.11  3.26 
11  3.34  3.37  3.17  3.14  \.66  2.23 
12  3.17  3.17  3.34  3.D  2.S9  2.94 
13  2.77  2.91  2.43  3  2.[4  2.71 
14  3.23  3.23  2.[1  2.97  2.97  3.37 
Avera~e  2.76  2.79  2.51  2M  2.S1  3.01 
0_.  _ 
median  2",7  3.11  2.56  3.09  2.94  3.06 
_.  _  .. - -_.~~. 
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Table 9.  Avera@~ social wdfare (ASW) in each market and on aggregate. Spearm,uHank corre1a-
tion coefficient (r) and t  -tc,t of time dependence of social we1fare in each market (treatments 1-3) 
Treat- Markel 
ment 
___  o 
ASW  942  674 
r,  O  SO  0.54 
I  3.11*  3.68' 
4  5  6  9  10  11  12  13  14  Av. 
1053  [140  1070  692  110';  1115  1m  1117  1009  1146  10H2  1164  1031 
O.OS  -0.41  0.03  -0,36  Olfi  -0.330.03 -0.[80.68  -0.53  -0.530.08  -0.1 
0.27  -2.61*  0.18  -2.23- OY3  -1.98  -0.19  -1.06  -5,30*-359*·3.56'  -0.45  -0.59 
~--r----+~~-----------------
2  ASW  995  923  1027  1058  IOSH  100(¡  994  R39  1021  773  1102  919  1072  1014  986 
r,  -emo.!1  0.33  -0.01  0.77  -0.270.20  0.16  -O.RX  0.11  -0.06  -059  OJO  0.38  -0.07 




t  _. 
11159  1061  1098  1022  1029  ll22  994  1053  1100  969  762  1085  1016  1006  1075 
-{ 560)7  -o 0\  -o 23  1)  15  -()  17  (]  16  040  -() 61  ·017  o  01  -o [5  o  2S  -() 28  -o 27  ._,  . - ,. 
-386*  ·1.60  0.18  1.36  0.87  0.98  094  2.5 l' -4.37*-2.26'  0.07  -0.85  1.48  1.66  -1.63 
.  _ .. -
:  Note: The null hypothcsis is  fin:  rolt, SW(t)]",o. Thc m,lcrisk (*) represents a rejection of Ho  al u oo.05 
level of significance (111)2041. The sign (-) indicatcs ncgativc correlation 
Table 10.  Resourl'e losscs by each quality water (trcatmcnts 1-3) due to under~exploitation 
(units of recharge which did nOl cntcr ¡he respective basin) 
_. 
Resource  Rcsource  #(KL < 3)  #(KII < 3)  II(KL=3)  #(KH = 3) 
Loss L  Loss H 
TI  216  IS9  195  200  147  157 
.T2  334  199  21R  210  153  110 
TI  225  119  lHO  178  92  100 
.  ~e: Symbol #  f!oles  lhe  Ilumher of observ~tions in  which lhe  quantity felt short of the constant 
nodical recharJ2c 
Ü 